Water Law Review
Volume 4

Issue 2

Article 56

1-1-2001

Dygard Land P'ship v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App. 2001)
Holly Kirsner

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Holly Kirsner, Court Report, Dygard Land P'ship v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App. 2001), 4 U. Denv.
Water L. Rev. 520 (2001).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 4

grant. Moreover, a conveyance of adjacent land, done by the owner of
both the water and the surrounding land, transfers riparian rights,
absent express provisions to the contrary. As the Lake was an
appurtenance to the deed and the deed did not exclude use of the
Lake, the court concluded The Pointe was entitled to free use of the
Lake.
LMA argued the non-navigability of the Lake prevented riparian
rights from passing in the deed. The court noted that navigability only
served to determine ownership of land under the water, and riparian
rights concerning use do attach to non-navigable water.
The court then addressed the nature and extent of The Pointe's
rights. The court acknowledged that the party attempting to prove an
implied easement existed must demonstrate three factors. First, the
party must show a separation of title occurred. The court found
separation of title occurred when LDC transferred the property to The
Pointe and LMA. Second, the party must demonstrate the use
continued over a long period. The court found over thirty years prior
to LDC's transfer, LDC created the Lake specifically to develop
lakeside homes on the adjacent property. Finally, the party must show
the easement was necessary for further enjoyment of the land. The
court noted that without access to the Lake, the property would be
useless for lakeside development. Therefore, the court held The
Pointe's rights to use the Lake were in the form of an implied
easement.
Sara Wagers
TEXAS
Dyegard Land P'ship v. Hoover, 39 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. App. 2001)
(holding original covenants prohibiting drilling for minerals did not
prohibit lot owners from drilling water wells because water is not a
mineral).
In May 1994, Dyegard Land Partnership ("Dyegard") with the
approval of Oak View Estates, a rural subdivision, filed a subdivision
plat and restrictive covenants with the Parker County Clerk. The
thirty-eight covenants restricted building design, construction
materials, and property use. Covenant eighteen expressly prohibited,
on any lot within Oak View Estates, the drilling, quarrying, mining,
prospecting, or development of minerals of any kind, and the
construction of wells, tunnels, tanks or any other structure used for
mineral boring.
In 1997, Robert and Jackie Hoover and Donald and Cynthia Tye
(collectively, the "Hoovers") purchased lots from Dyegard with notice
that their lots were subject to the original covenants.
Dyegard
provided Oak View Estates with water from a central water system.
After purchasing the lots, the Hoovers discovered problems with
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pressure, quantity, and volume of water provided, and explored the
possibility of drilling a private well on their lots. Dyegard denied their
request, claiming covenant eighteen barred water well drilling.
Subsequently, Dyegard amended covenant eighteen to expressly
prohibit well drilling for private water sources.
The Hoovers filed suit for declaratory judgment in the District
Court of Parker County, claiming the covenants did not restrict water
well drilling on their lots. Dyegard's response stated the amended
covenants specifically prohibited drilling water wells and further, the
original covenant language prohibited water well drilling. The
Hoovers filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court
granted the Hoovers' motion.
Dyegard appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals of
Texas, and contended the trial court erred because the original
covenants expressly prohibited well drilling. Moreover, Dyegard
argued the trial court erred because the amended covenants were
enforceable.
Dyegard argued the covenant clearly prohibited drilling for water,
because water is a mineral. The court of appeals did not agree. The
appellate court pointed to Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., where
that court held the definition of minerals excluded water.
Furthermore, the Texas Property Code defines mineral to mean oil,
gas uranium, sulphur, and other substances, yet, purposely omits
water.
The appellate court also noted that laws pertaining to
groundwater developed entirely separately from oil and gas law.
Covenant eighteen's extensive list of mining prohibitions contributed
to the court's conclusion that the covenant referred to minerals, and
not water. The appellate court concluded the Hoovers could drill
water wells under the original covenants, because water is not a
mineral.
Dyegard maintained the amended covenant clarified any
ambiguity by clearly prohibiting water wells within Oak View Estates.
The Hoovers argued the amended covenants were not valid, because
the original covenants did not authorize Dyegard to make
modifications to the covenants without property owner concurrence.
The appellate court concluded the original covenants clearly reserved
the developer's right to amend the covenants, thus finding Dyegard's
amendment valid as a matter of law.
The appellate court affirmed summary judgment that the original
covenants allowed the Hoovers to drill water wells, reversed summary
judgment regarding the amended covenants' validity, and remanded
for further proceedings.
Holly Kirsner
Hess v. McLean Feedyard, Inc., No. 07-99-0519-CV, 2000 Tex. App.
LEXIS 8114 (Tex. App. Nov. 28, 2000) (affirming no-evidence
summary judgment motion on basis that landowners failed to produce
expert evidence on the cause of alleged water contamination).

